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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE / PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Millions of dollars are spent each year on quick reaction capability (QRC) 
Information Warfare (IW) and intelligence collection systems.  These information 
technology (IT) systems are used to fill existing capability gaps at the Fleet, theater and 
strategic level.  Managing these portfolios of equipment as an investment requires that 
program managers be able to maximize the benefits of the systems in a systematic 
manner while considering the impact of cost throughout the enterprise.  To successfully 
accomplish this task, it is essential to develop a means and methodology to measure the 
performance of the IT investments in an objective manner.  As of yet, no acceptable 
measure of their performance or benefit has been developed to determine whether the 
systems are yielding an adequate level of performance or return on investment (ROI).   
B. BACKGROUND 
Intelligence, as stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United 
States, is the nation’s first line of defense against terrorists and other hostile nations.  The 
document calls for innovation within the armed forces to transform intelligence and 
exploit the country’s advantages in science and technology, stating the following: 
Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new 
approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. 
intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and 
technology […] We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build 
new ones to keep pace with the nature of these threats.1 
According to the NSS, intelligence capabilities must be transformed and new capabilities 
must be built to keep pace with emerging threats.  Intelligence systems must be 
appropriately integrated with defense and law enforcement systems as well as Allied 
systems.  The NSS calls for hard choices to “ensure the right level and allocation of 
government spending on national security.”2 It also calls for an investment in future 
intelligence capabilities and a strong security infrastructure to prevent the compromise of 
                                                 
1 United States. President. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington, White House, 2002. p. 30. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> [1 June, 2005]. 
2 Ibid. pp. 30-31. 
2 
those capabilities.  Lastly, the NSS acknowledges the managerial changes that must be 
made stating that “[w]e must also transform the way the Department of Defense is run, 
especially in financial management.”3 
Transformation of the business practices internal to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), to include financial and program management, is a key enabler for achieving the 
intelligence goals of the NSS.4  With this mandate, the DoD established the Defense 
Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.1, dated 12 May 2003, to manage the 
technological investments, resources and programs required to accomplish the NSS and 
support the Armed Forces.  The primary objective of the DoD 5000 Series is to acquire 
“quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable 
price.” 5  To realign the individual services’ intelligence efforts with the DoD 
transformational practices, coordinative mechanisms such as the Joint Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operational Concept and the Joint ISR 
Operational Architecture (ISR JOC/JOA), have been created.6 
1. Navy ISR 
The Naval Transformation Roadmap of 2003 calls for the reengineering of 
maritime ISR to align with the DoD’s 5000 Series and joint warfighting concepts with the 
goal of redefining standards and metrics and ensuring interoperability, while providing 
the warfighter required capabilities in a timely, cost-effective and efficient manner.7  
Maritime ISR lies at the core of the Naval Operational Doctrine and is an essential 
element in improving the speed and effectiveness of naval and joint operations.  It is 
necessary, with today’s threat, to expand the range of ISR options available to the 
commander and ensure decision superiority across the range of military operations in 
accordance with the NSS.  From a program management point of view, there are several 
                                                 
3 United States. President. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington, White House, 2002. p. 30. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> [1 June, 2005]. 
4 Ibid. 31. 
5 Department of Defense. DoD Directive 5000.1. “The Defense Acquisition System.” 12 May 2003. p. 
2. 
6 Department of the Navy. Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power 
Projection…From the Sea.  Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 2003. pp.68-69. 
7 Ibid. 69. 
3 
challenges in meeting future requirements.  First, program mangers must create a 
requirements management program that will thoroughly capture the joint warfighters’ 
seemingly intangible inputs and translate them as accurately as possible to ensure the 
system will satisfy the user requirements.  Next, needs and requirements must be 
transformed into a comprehensive set of product and process system descriptions to 
“solve” the ISR problem in a top-down manner by applying the Systems Engineering 
Process (SEP).  The requirement for the integration of cutting-edge technology and 
limited resources must be leveraged with the use of Commercial Off-The Shelf and 
Government Off-The-Shelf (COTS/GOTS) systems in an Open Architecture (OA) that 
will integrate seamlessly with existing systems.  Lastly, innovative techniques to 
metricize Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) must be developed to facilitate integrated 
Testing and Evaluation of Navy and Joint ISR programs.   
With this backdrop, the goal of Navy ISR program managers is to develop an 
investment strategy for maritime ISR systems consistent with validated warfighter 
requirements and within the framework of approved architectures. The strategy should 
adhere to a national-level strategic view, and balance the development of new 
intelligence collection capabilities, modernization of current systems, and sustainment of 
existing infrastructures, as well as move toward robust interoperability.  The DoD 5000 
Series and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
delineated in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01E, dated 11 
May 2003, and other governing documents such as the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA), and the Information Technology Management and Results Act 
(ITMRA) serve as a guidelines for addressing these challenges. 
2. The Cryptologic Carry-On Program 
The Cryptologic Carry-On Program (CCOP) is a product of the Advanced 
Cryptologic Systems Engineering program, which develops state-of-the-art Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in response to Combatant Command 
requirements for a quick-reaction surface, subsurface and airborne cryptologic carry-on 
capability.  CCOP systems have broad scope and functions.  There are approximately 100 
cryptologic capable surface ships in the current Navy inventory.  Each of these ships is a 
potential user of carry-on equipment.  In addition, there are numerous subsurface and air 
4 
platforms that are also potential users.  CCOP provides the necessary resources to enable 
a rapid transition of available Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) and Government off the 
Shelf (GOTS) technologies that apply ISR system functionalities. These technologies 
typically require various levels of integration to leverage on-board capabilities that 
provide system and mission management, product reporting and data analysis support.  
COTS/GOTS systems usually require some level of adaptation or modification to meet 
fleet requirements.  Before deployment for operational use, systems must be 
systematically tested to ensure suitable and reliable operation.  They must also be tested 
for network vulnerabilities (if connected to Navy or Joint networks), and tested against 
joint interoperability requirements. 8 
3. Acquisitions Implications 
The Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, 12 May 2003, states that advanced 
technology shall be integrated into producible systems and deployed in the shortest time 
practicable to address “capability gaps” between stated national security threats and the 
ability to properly address them with current capabilities.9  Evolutionary Acquisition 
(EA) is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technologies.  An 
evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the need 
for future capability improvements.10  The CCOP shares this objective of EA, which is to 
balance needs and available capabilities with resources, and to put capability into the 
hands of the user quickly. 
a. COTS/GOTS and Open Architectures 
The DoDD 5000.1 also states “A modular, open systems approach 
(MOSA) shall be employed, where feasible.”  Historically, cutting-edge ISR systems 
were costly and often “stovepiped.”  They were not readily adaptable or reconfigurable 
for a rapidly changing global threat.  The DoD mandated use of MOSA and a migration 
to open systems architectures that incorporate commercial solutions to address the fast-
                                                 
8 Department of Defense. “The Advanced Cryptologic Systems Engineering Program: Budget Item 
Justification.” Washington: February,2004. 
<http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/Navy/0204574N.pdf#search='Advanced%20Cryptologic%20S
ystems%20Engineering%20program'> [April 2005] 
9 DoDD 5000.1, 12 May 2003. p. 2.  
10 Department of Defense. DoD Instruction 5000.2. “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.” 
12 May 2003. p. 3. 
5 
paced threat.  A number of information systems architectures, policies, procedures and 
standards have been developed and implemented to enable the interoperability of these 
new systems and facilitate the migration.11  MOSA enables CCOP systems to be 
designed for affordable change with reduced life cycle costs.  It also facilitates the 
employment of evolutionary acquisition with more opportunities for technology insertion 
and shortens the total acquisition time. 
b. Risk Management 
The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (June 2003) defines 
risk management as “the art and science of panning, assessing, and handling future events 
to ensure favorable outcomes.  The alternative to risk management is crisis management.” 
The use of COTS/GOTS and MOSA in the CCOP all provide a level of risk, which must 
be managed.  The increasing system technological complexities, the reliance on complex 
software, along with shortened acquisitions timelines and funding instability all 
contribute to this risk.  Modeling and simulation (M&S) tools should be used to mitigate 
some of the risk in the CCOP.  In particular, cost models should be employed to 
determine projected lifecycle costs along with manpower and performance M&S tools.  
The Defense acquisition Guide Book (Nov 2004) suggests that alternatives to the 
traditional cost estimation need to be considered because legacy cost models tend not to 
adequately address costs associated with information systems.12 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to develop a decision support model and 
methodology to assist in the budgeting process for the United States Navy’s Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) CCOP Program Office (OPNAV N201) acquisition of 
information warfare systems.  The model will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the CCOP portfolio of IW systems in support of the achievement of the Navy ISR 
mission.  The methodology will be used to develop quantitative objectives that are based 
on measurable data and quantifiable criteria.  Once measures are defined, an objective 
performance baseline for each system in the portfolio can be created with which to 
                                                 
11 Department of Defense. Maritime SIGINT Architecture Technical Standards Handbook v. 1.0. Ft. 
George G. Meade, MD: NSA/CSS, 23 August 1999. p. 6. 
12 Department of Defense. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook. The Defense Acquisition University. 
Sect. 4.5.7.2 
6 
compare the impact of existing and future CCOP systems on individual activities, 
processes and operations.  The resulting information can then be utilized to make sound 
financial decisions and projections in the acquisition and deployment of these systems. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will attempt to model the intelligence collection process (ICP), as it 
applies to shipborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, and measure the impact of 
CCOP Systems on the process utilizing the Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) 
methodology.  First, all assets, subprocesses, and outputs will be identified.  The analysis 
of assets will encompass all cost data related to each asset in the process, human and IT.  
The subprocess analysis will contain a detailed breakdown of the ICP to include the time-
to-learn and number of executions for each subprocess.  The process outputs will also be 
analyzed to include the total number of process outputs and a surrogate revenue stream 
that will be used to monetize the outputs.  Next, asset costs will be allocated throughout 
the subprocesses in which they contribute to the production of outputs.  The time-to-
learn, or knowledge embedded in each subprocess will be multiplied by the number of 
executions of that subprocess.  The resulting figure will be used as a basis for the KVA 
Approach for allocating revenue at the subprocess level.  Once a cost and benefit for each 
subprocess has been determined, performance ratios such as ROA and ROI can be 
calculated. 
Comparing performance measures of various configurations of CCOP systems 
within the shipborne ICP can assist program managers in identifying targets of 





II. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
A. WHAT IS ROI? 
While there are many forms of “return” such as return on equity (ROE), return on 
performance (ROP) and return on assets (ROA), the focus of this research is the 
overarching concept of Return on Investment (ROI). 
1. ROI Defined 
Return on Investment or ROI has been defined in many ways, but it has generally 
been known to encompass the quantification of the past, present, and potential future 
performance of an organization or business.  More specifically, the return on investment 
in assets is a measure of performance that is determined by the percentage relationship of 
earnings to assets.13  Many companies and organizations view ROI both as a goal as well 
as a measure of profit and asset performance.  In its most generic form, it is characterized 




In this equation, earnings, or the net operating income of an organization or business is 
the difference between revenue and expenses.  Investment can also carry a wide 
connotation, but in a general case, the amount of investment is determined by an 
examination of an organization’s original capital and its assets, both financial and 
physical.  Thus, a higher return, or percentage ROI, indicates a more efficient and 
effective use of those assets and capital. 
 Another view of ROI, by Clarence Nickerson, a Professor of Business 
Administration Emeritus at the Harvard University Graduate School of Business 
Administration, recognizes that “the value of a business property is dependent on what it 
                                                 
13 Nickerson, Clarence B. Accounting Handbook for Nonaccountants. 3rd Ed.  New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1986. p. 73. 
14 Ibid. 632. 
8 
can produce.”15  He also states, “in order to judge the value of the wealth created, we 
should take into account the property required to produce it.”16   
As a practical mater, ROI can be used to determine the potential benefit of a 
single investment strategy or of multiple strategic investment options.  Forecasting 
revenue streams and comparing them with the expected capital investment and operating 
costs of a single strategy over the course of time, or of multiple strategies can accomplish 
this.  ROI yields valuable insight for managers and investors making high-level business 
strategy decisions.  But what if an organization produces no measurable “revenue,” in the 
business sense of the word? 
 
B. ROI IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As the budgets of public sector organizations are coming under increased 
scrutiny, stakeholders, managers and taxpayers are all demanding a higher level of 
accountability and transparency of the public investment in those organizations.  
Additionally, regulations such as the Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
(GPRA), require the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in 
programs for the accountability of their expenditures.  Faced with these challenges, 
public sector organizations have been, for many years, searching for a defensible means 
of producing the metrics required to measure the value of the services and products they 
provide.  In some cases, an organization may produce outputs that are similar to those of 
a commercial organization or business, allowing that organization to directly place a 
value to its products and services based on the market price or value of the commercial 
products.  But many public sector organizations are inherently different, and require a 
different approach to the determination of their ROI. 
1. The Public Sector Problem 
There are several issues that must be considered when conducting an ROI analysis 
in the public sector.  First, the frequent absence of measurable revenues and profits make 
it a challenge to determine the overall benefit stream produced by the organization.  
Secondly, hard data is often difficult to collect amidst an abundance of seemingly 
                                                 
15 Nickerson, Clarence B.  Accounting Handbook for Nonaccountants.  3rd Ed.  New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1986. p. 652. 
16 Ibid. 
9 
intangible, soft data.  Also, ROI depends on the notion of costs and benefits.  In the 
public sector though, the recipients of the benefits or stakeholders are not easily 
identifiable; potential beneficiaries could be program participants, managers of 
participants, sponsors of the program or even taxpayers who are concerned about their 
tax-dollars.  Another problem lies at the very nature of public-sector organizations and 
government services in particular, whose services are “essential” and must be provided, 
regardless of the accountability or cost.  Lastly, public-sector organizations do not often 
have the range of flexibility or options to correct problems and make radical changes.17 
2. The Public Sector Reality 
The reality of public-sector organizations is that they do provide benefits, 
although in most cases these are presented in the form of cost savings resulting from 
improved quality, increased productivity or timesaving initiatives.  Monetizing the 
benefits directly may be difficult, but new approaches to the problem are currently being 
developed.  The issue of hard data is also one that can be overcome; output, quality, cost 
and time are all usually measurable in private as well as public-sector organizations and 
represent viable categories of hard data.  The notion that services provided by 
government organizations are essential and above scrutiny is also being dispelled; 
regulations such as the GPRA are requiring all agencies to undergo evaluation to ensure 
they are operating effectively and efficiently.18  And finally, identifying flexibility or 
options in public-sector organizations is not only possible, but required if a desire exists 
to improve the effectiveness of public programs and services. 
This research focuses on public sector ROI as it applies to the Department of 
Defense and a portfolio of information technology (IT) assets.  Because of the variable 
nature of IT and their benefits, determining ROI on them poses some unique challenges.  
 
C. IT ROI 
Organizations, public and private, make investments in information technology 
with the goal of improving the efficiency, timeliness, quality and effectiveness of their 
                                                 
17 Phillips, Patricia P. “ROI in the Public Sector.” Ed. Patricia Phillips. Alexandria, VA: American 
Society for Training and Development, 2002. <http://www.astd.org/NR/rdonlyres/779B0547-EB1F-48E5-
8776-7808107FD010/0/Whitepaper.pdf#search='ROI%20in%20the%20public%20sector'> [August 2005] 
 18 Ibid. 
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services, products or processes.  The problem these organizations face though, is 
discerning the amount of value contributed by their IT investments on the processes in 
which they are meant to operate.   
1. Current Approaches 
There have been numerous approaches to assessing the impact of IT on an 
organization’s fiscal performance at the corporate and sub-corporate levels of 
aggregation.  Table 1 summarizes some of the most common approaches to measuring 
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Table 1. Common Approaches to Measuring Return on IT. 19 
These approaches are subdivided into two distinct levels of analysis, the corporate level 
and the sub-corporate level.  Corporate-level approaches seek to determine the 
contribution of the assets, both knowledge and IT, on the overall performance of the 
organization.  The sub-corporate-level approaches look internally at the sub-processes 
which are involved in the production of organizational output and attempt to establish a 
measure for the benefits of knowledge and IT assets within each sub-process.  The goal 
of each approach is to provide managers with a metric of value for their organization’s 
investment in IT and knowledge assets. 
 
D. MANAGING IT INVESTMENTS IN THE DOD 
It is the stated goal of the Department of Defense (DoD) that all information 
technology (IT) programs within the organization be managed as investments rather than 
acquisitions.  To accomplish this, and to fall within the framework of regulations and 
legislation such as the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the 
Information Technology Management and Results Act (ITMRA), the DoD has made it its 
goal to establish performance measures in the IT investment process.   
 
 
                                                 
19 Housel, T., Jansen, E., Pavlou, P. & Rodgers, W. “Measuring the Return on Information 
Technology: A Knowledge-Based Approach for Revenue Allocation at the Process and Firm Level.” 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, August 2005.  
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1. Defining IT Performance Measures in the DoD 
The Department of Defense Guide for Managing Information Technology (IT) as 
an Investment and Measuring Performance v.1.0 (10 February 1997), defines IT 
performance measure as: 
the assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of IT in support of the 
achievement of an organization’s missions, goals, and quantitative 
objectives through the application of outcome-based, measurable, and 
quantifiable criteria, compared against an established baseline, to 
activities, operations, and processes […] Performance Measurement is the 
means by which an organization measures it effectiveness and efficiency 
in the pursuit of its missions, goals, and objectives.20 
Effectiveness implies accomplishing the required mission tasks and goals while ensuring 
customer satisfaction and high quality.  Efficiency implies that the best possible use of 
available resources was employed to improve quantity or work, reduce costs and improve 
timeliness of the overall project.   
2. Steps for Effective Performance Measurement 
To assist managers in maximizing the benefits of IT investments, the guide 
outlines six steps in effective performance measurement:21 
• Define mission, key result areas, and business functions. 
• Develop mission related goals. 
• Generate performance measures/indicators. 
• Validate and verify performance measures. 
• Implement the performance measures and collect data. 
• Monitor and assess the results and repeat the process as needed. 
3. Levels of Management 
The DoD also recognizes that managers at different levels of any organization 
require different types of information from which to base their investment and business 
                                                 
20 Department of Defense. Guide for Managing Information Technology (IT) as an Investment and 
Measuring Performance. Version 1.0.  Arlington, Virginia: Vector Research Inc., 10 February 1997. ES-i.  
21 Ibid. 
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strategies on.  The guide identifies three management levels:  Enterprise, Functional, and 
Program/Project Level.22  At the Enterprise Level, managers are focused on policy and 
mission decisions to guide the strategic direction of acquisition decisions.  The 
Functional Level managers focus on unit results and improving the operational processes 
which produce them, mission related outcome measures are also developed at this level.  
At the Program/Project Level, managers and project leaders focus on the activities and 
tasks critical to making and executing tactical and management decisions.  Program 
managers and project leaders are also the focal point from which the other levels receive 
detailed performance and valuation data for individual systems, projects, processes and 
activities.  This is the level where the CCOP Program Office functions and where this 
research was primarily focused. 
4. Performance Measurement at the Program/Project Level 
Program/Project-Level managers and leaders capture and generate the information 
required by managers at the other two levels.  It is necessary, at this level, to determine 
what key information is needed to develop defensible, accurate and meaningful 
performance measures.  Among these measures is Return on Investment, ROI. 
At a minimum, ROI consists of both a return (i.e., benefit) component and an 
investment (i.e., cost) component.  The cost component measures the number of 
investment dollars management has placed into the human, infrastructure and IT assets of 
the program or project; this information is generally documented in detail.  Benefit 
measures are much more complex.  The DoD guide defines “the accomplishment of 
functional missions and goals,”23 as a measure of benefit.  How a program, project, 
process or asset contributes to overall mission accomplishment is normally a matter of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  The question often raised though is “how is efficiency and 
effectiveness measured and how do they translate into dollars?” 
To be mathematically sound, ROI requires that benefits AND costs be monetized.  
While mangers or analysts can directly measure the benefits of some investments in 
monetary terms (e.g., cost savings or lower overhead), oftentimes they cannot be directly 
                                                 
22 Department of Defense. Guide for Managing Information Technology (IT) as an Investment and 
Measuring Performance. Version 1.0. Arlington, Virginia: Vector Research Inc., 10 February 1997. p. 3-4. 
23 Ibid. 6-9. 
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measured monetarily.  Such is usually the case with many IT systems, projects and 
programs.  The DoD Guide summarizes 12 approaches to measuring the performance of 
IT that are similar to those in Table 1, but recognizes that the list is not complete.24  The 







                                                 
24 Department of Defense. Guide for Managing Information Technology (IT) as an Investment and 
Measuring Performance. Version 1.0.  Arlington, Virginia: Vector Research Inc., 10 February 1997. p. 8-1. 
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III. THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED METHODOLOGY 
A. THE COMPARABILITY AND VALUE PROBLEM 
There are several situations the realm of business and non-profit organizations 
that can benefit from a method for measuring the value of knowledge assets both human 
and IT.  The first hurdle in solving the problem is defining what is meant by “value”.  
The simplest measure of value, as presented by Dr. Myron L. Cramer, is dollars:  how 
much is earned or saved.  The metric of dollar-value is primarily used in assessing 
contributions in a commercial or business context.25  A problem exists though, when 
applying dollar-value in the DoD case where different methods are used to assess how 
systems or people contribute “value” to combat effectiveness or mission completion.  
These methods often fail to capture the benefit stream produced by organizations, 
processes or assets in standard or comparable units of measure.  And oftentimes, the only 
metric that is measured with any level of standardization and accuracy is cost.  Benefits, 
while measured in terms of varying degrees of contribution, are seldom represented in the 
monetized fashion required by traditional accounting methods for extracting a value or 
Return on Investment.  
Another problem present in the DoD case is the translation of outputs into monetary 
benefits.  Whereas in the commercial case, a price per unit is assigned to the outputs, 
there is no equivalent pricing mechanism in the DoD or non-profit case.  This presents a 
problem when conducting empirical financial analysis and in particular when seeking a 
baseline from which to formulate sound fiscal decisions. 
 
B. THE KVA SOLUTION 
1. Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory 
Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) created by Dr. Tom Housel (Naval Postgraduate 
School) and Dr. Valery Kanevsky (Agilent Labs).  Initiated almost 15 years ago, KVA 
was built on tenets of complexity and entropy theory, and was developed in response to 
business process reengineering efforts of organizations that, with no other method 
                                                 
25 Cramer, Myron. “Measuring the Value of Information.” Atlanta, GA: Georgia Tech Research 
Institute. <http://iw.gtri.gatech.edu> [20 July 2005]. p. 2 
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available, focused primarily on cost cutting measures to determine the “value” of a 
process or knowledge asset.  KVA is based on the assumption that humans and 
technology in organizations add value by taking inputs and changing them into outputs 
through core processes.26  The amount of change an asset or process produces can, in 
fact, be a measure of value or benefit. 
KVA is a general theory for estimating the value added by knowledge assets, 
human and IT, using a methodology that is analytic and tautological.  It is based on the 
premise that businesses and other organizations produce outputs (e.g., products and 
services) through a series of processes and subprocesses which change, in some manner, 
the raw inputs (i.e., labor into services, information into reports).  KVA explains the 
changes made on the inputs by organizational processes to produce outputs in terms of 
the equivalent corresponding changes in entropy.  The concept of entropy is defined in 
the American Heritage Dictionary as a “measure of the degree of disorder [or change] in 
a closed system.”  In the business context, it can be used as a surrogate for the amount of 
changes that a process makes to inputs to produce the resulting outputs. 27 
2. KVA Assumptions 
KVA uses knowledge-based metaphor to operationalize the relationship between 
change in entropy and value added.  The units of change induced by a process to produce 
an output are described in terms of the knowledge required to make the changes.  More 
specifically, the time it takes the average learner “to acquire the procedural knowledge 
required to produce a process output provides a practical surrogate for the corresponding 
changes in entropy.”28  This concept is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
 
                                                 
26 Housel, T. and Bell, A. Measuring and Managing Knowledge. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001. pp. 92-
93. 
27 Housel, T. El Sawy, O., Zhong, J., and Rodgers, W. “Models for Mearsuring the Reutrn on 
Information Technology: A Proof of Concept Demonstration.” 22nd International Conference on Inormation 
Systems. December, 2001. p. 13. 
28 Ibid.  
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Figure 1.   The Housel-Kanevsky Value-Added Cycle.29 
 
KVA theory also assumes that all process outputs can be described in equivalent 
units (e.g., the time required to learn how to produce outputs).  The advantages of this 
level of process output description include:30 
• The ability to compare all processes in terms of their relative productivity 
• The ability to allocate revenue to a common unit of output 
• The ability to describe the value added by IT in terms of the outputs it 
produces 
• The ability to relate outputs to the cost to produce those outputs in 
common units 
• A common unit of measure for organizational productivity 
By describing all process outputs in common units it is possible for managers and 
analysts to assign revenue, as well as cost, to those units at any given point in time.  With 
the resulting information, traditional accounting and financial performance and 
profitability metrics can be applied at the sub-organizational level. 
Other assumptions include the concept of Learning Time.  Learning Time is 
measured in common units of time and is a surrogate for the procedural knowledge 
required to produce process outputs.  Units of Learning Time represent common units of 
output which are described by the variable K.  Procedural knowledge can be embedded in 
process assets such as IT, employees, training manuals, etc.  A single execution of a 
process is equivalent to a single unit of output, represented by a given number of  
                                                 
29 Housel and Bell. 2001. 
30 Housel, et  al. December 2001. p. 11. 
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common units, K.  Additional levels of detail in process descriptions provide additional 
levels of accuracy in the estimation of the number of knowledge units comprising those 
processes. 
3. Three Approaches to KVA 
In addition to the Learning Time approach for calculating KVA, Table 2 





Binary Query Method 
Identify compound 
process and its 
component processes. 
Identify compound 
process and its 
component processes. 
Identify compound 
process and its 
component processes. 
Establish common units to 
measure learning time. 
Describe the products in 
terms of the instructions 
required to reproduce 
them and select unit of 
process description 
Create a set of binary 
YES/NO questions such 
that all possible outputs 
are represented as a 
sequence of YES/NO 
answers. 
Calculate learning time to 
execute each component 
process. 
Calculate number of 
process description words, 
pages in manual, lines of 
computer code pertaining 
to each process. 
Calculate length of 
sequence of YES/NO 
answers for each 
component processes. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Multiply the learning time 
for each component 
process by the number of 
times the component 
executes during sample 
period. 
Multiply the number of 
process words used to 
describe each component 
process by the number of 
times the component 
executes during sample 
period. 
Multiply the length of the 
YES/NO string for each 
component process by the 
number of times this 
component executes 
during sample period. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
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Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Table 2. Three Approaches of KVA.31 
 






























                                                 
31 Walsh, David. “Knowledge Value Added: Assessing both Fixed and Variable Value.” Business 
Process Audits.Com. White Papers. Business Process Audits.Com, 13 August 1998. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY CASE STUDY: USS READINESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2004, the staff of the United States Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations 
(OPNAV) directed its Cryptologic Carry-On Program Office (OPNAV N201) to focus on 
three goals for the following fiscal year: Efficiencies, Metrics, and Return on 
Investment.32  Measuring efficiencies, developing proper metrics, and determining return 
on investment of the CCOP portfolio of Information Warfare (IW) systems had, for many 
years, seemed a bridge too far.  Faced with this challenge and with the yearly challenge 
of deciding how to allocate precious funding dollars to the twelve IW systems which 
currently make up the CCOP portfolio, Lieutenant Commander Brian Prevo, the CCOP 
program officer had to answer some fundamental questions.  Should he merely give each 
an equal amount of continuous funding?  Should he ask which ones needed the most 
funding to continue or upgrade?  Should he ask the users which ones they liked?  None of 
these questions really went to the heart of the problem from his perspective.  He really 
wanted a relatively objective estimate of the contribution of performance of each.  The 
simple question for him to answer before he made his next moves was, “What is the 
return on investment of each CCOP system?”  Further, he wanted to know the best 
strategic “options” for the employment and deployment of his systems.  He wanted to 
know where his investments might provide the best future performance in supporting the 
Navy’s Global Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission. 
LCDR Prevo turned to a team from the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
Graduate School of Operations and Information Sciences, Dr.’s Tom Housel and 
Johnathan Mun, to help him devise a way to allocate his limited funding resources.  He 
also enlisted the help of a fellow Naval Cryptologist and Information Warfare Officer 
who happened to be a student at NPS, LCDR Cesar Rios.  Rios had operated CCOP 
systems and other IW systems while conducting ISR missions from various Navy 
platforms, to include ships and aircraft.  As team lead and subject matter expert, LCDR 
Rios sought advice from Dr.’s Housel and Mun about how to structure this problem in a 
                                                 
32 Department of the Navy. CCOP Program Briefing. Power Point. Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 
CCOP Program Office (OPNAV N201C), 25 April 2005. 
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way that would provide the ROI and options information that the CCOP Program Office 
needed to make resource allocation decisions.  Mun would provide the real options (RO) 
analysis approach which would be conducted in follow-on to this research.  The 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) approach provides the raw data necessary for this kind 
of analysis.  Housel is an expert in the KVA methodology.  KVA provides a method for 
describing the output of all process assets (human and information technology) in 
common units.  Market comparables can then be generated from the commercial world to 
estimate the price per common unit, which allows revenue estimates for the process 
outputs of non-profit organizations such as the U.S. Navy.  It also allows a cost per unit 
of output that, when combined with the revenue estimates, provides the raw data for ROI 
analysis. 
Armed with these methodologies, the team began the process of collecting the 
data required to provide LCDR Prevo with the analysis he needed to support is CCOP 
resource allocation decisions.  The following is a synopsis of the research, including the 
use of new software that provides KVA and RO analysis. 
1. Objective 
The overall objective of the research was to develop a model and methodology to 
assist in the CCOP Program Office’s budgeting process for the acquisition of information 
warfare systems.  The model was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems 
in support of the achievement of the Navy Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) mission.  The methodology had to be capable of producing measurable objectives 
that were reliable and based on clearly defined criteria.  Once measures were defined, an 
objective performance baseline for each system in the portfolio could be created with 
which to compare the impact of existing and future CCOP systems on ISR activities, 
processes and operations.  The resulting information could then be utilized to make 
grounded and defensible financial decisions and projections in the acquisition and 
deployment of these systems. 
2. Method 
This case study demonstrated the operationalization of the Knowledge Value 
Added (KVA) Methodology’s ability to extract the measurable and quantifiable data 
required to develop a performance baseline for valuing the impact of CCOP systems on 
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the process in which they are employed, the Intelligence Collection Process (ICP).  In 
particular, this case focused on the shipborne ICP and the performance of the human and 
information technology (IT) components that comprise the process. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
The Performance metrics of CCOP systems operating within the ICP can be 
derived by applying the Knowledge Value Added Methodology.  These metrics can be 
used to apply financial estimates for the determination of Return on Investment, Return 
on Assets and Return on Performance. 
C. ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION 
1. The ICP and CCOP 
To accurately measure the performance of CCOP systems it is necessary to 
observe the systems as they operate within the overall ICP along with the fixed 
infrastructure and human operators.  Although the ICP differs slightly between the 
multiple collection platforms (i.e., aircraft, destroyers, cruisers, etc.), the process will be 
described at a general-enough level to achieve an aggregate view of the process elements 
and their outputs.   
CCOP systems have a broad scope of capabilities and functions.  Within the ICP, 
they may be used to perform operations in a single subprocess or in multiple 
subprocesses simultaneously.  CCOP systems may be used in a stand-alone manner, or 
they may augment existing infrastructure or capabilities onboard the ISR platform.  The 
systems are also capable of performing fully automated functions as well as human-
enabled functions.  It is this particular mix of dynamic behaviors that makes analyzing 
CCOP systems a challenge. 
2. The Data Collection Challenge 
The ISR Mission is generally conducted at a highly classified level.  Many 
particulars of the ICP and the CCOP systems and their outputs are closely guarded 
information.  Deriving the information required to perform analysis at the unclassified 
level is difficult, and at times, impossible.  For the purpose of academic research, much 
of the data was estimated or inferred based on realistic sampling of unclassified process 
information.  Information on human capital, such as salaries and operator training, are 
public information and were gathered from sources such as the Stay Navy Website and 
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the Center for Information Dominance (CID) training documentation.  The equipment 
data was also derived or inferred from documentation provided by the OPNAV N20 staff 
and the Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR).  Other information such as 
number of process outputs and executions were extrapolated from samples gathered via 
interviews with ISR crews currently operating onboard, deployed U.S. Navy surface 
ships. 
D. MODELING THE USS READINESS ICP 
The intelligence collection process (ICP) is the means by which tactical Navy 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) units (i.e., ships, aircraft and other 
platforms) receive requests for intelligence or intelligence collection tasking and apply 
various human disciplines and IT technologies to search, acquire, process and report 
results back to tactical users (i.e., fleet staffs and strike groups), and national-level 
consumers (i.e., NSA).  The following table is a brief description of the generalized 
process: 
  Sub-Process Name 
Sub-Process 
Description 
P1 Review Request • Determine if collection capability is available 
• Determine if further direction or info required 
P2 Determine Op/Equip Mix • Review directives and target information to 
determine type/category of target 
P3 Input Search/Function into CCOP • Assign search blocks and allocate system 
resources to each target 
P4 Search/Collection Process • Targeted or full spectrum search 
• Observe sensor data for target cues 
P5 Target Data Acquisition/Capture • Audio Routing 
• Record/Capture Data 
P6 Target Data Processing • Demodulate, decrypt, direction find (DF), or 
Geo-locate 
• Translate 
P7 Target Data Analysis • Human or IT-based analysis of captured data 
P8 Format Data for Report 
Generation 
• Input data into required reporting formats 
P9 QC Report • Check format, accuracy and adherence to 
tasking, regulations and laws 
P10 Transmit Report • Transmit via secure voice radio, secure 
internet relay chat, US Message Traffic 
Format 
Table 3. The Intelligence Collection Process (ICP). 
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Each sub-process can be further broken down into individual actions that may be 
required to perform the subprocess.  Below is the breakdown of sub-process P6 Target 
Data Processing: 
P6 Target Data Processing 
  Human-based (no automation required) 
       Manual copy directly into report 
       Human translation & processing 
  IT-based 
       Direct transfer into report 
       Demodulate 
          All IT-based 
          Human-enabled 
       Decrypt 
          All IT-based 
          Human-enabled 
       Direction finding 
          Automatic - Local Line Of Bearing (LOB) 
          Human-enabled - local LOB 
          Human-enabled - B-rep request 
       Geolocation 
       Special processing 
Table 4. Process P6 Activities. 
 
1. USS READINESS 
USS READINESS is a fictitious U.S. Navy warship which has been outfitted for 
conducting ISR missions.  Along with the general manning, the ship has a contingent of 
Information Warfare operators who perform the ICP utilizing CCOP systems that 
interconnect with a pre-existing IT infrastructure.  For the purpose of this research, it is 
assumed that the ship is on a typical six-month deployment and receives daily tasking for 
ISR collection from higher authorities as well as intelligence requirements from the 
commanding officer and group commanders.  In response to tasking, the ISR crew 
onboard USS READINESS produces a variety of reports which include raw-intelligence 
reports, technical reports, analyst-to-analyst exchanges and daily collection summaries.  








Assigned to ICP 
Processes 
Division Officer  1,2,9  
Division Leading Petty 
Officer  1,2,9,7  
Signals Operator 1  3-7,9  
Signals Operator 2  3-7  
Signals Operator 3  4-7  
Signals Operator 4  4-7  
Signals Operator 5  4-7  
Comms Operator 1  8,10 
Comms Operator 2  8,10 
Comms Operator 3  8,10 
Table 5. USS READINESS ISR Crew. 
USS READINESS is outfitted with four CCOP systems (A, B, C, and D) which 
operate in the following subprocesses: 
  Subprocess Name 
CCOP 
Assigned 
P1 Review Request/Tasking  A  
P2 Determine Op/Equip Mix  A  
P3 Input Search Function/Coverage Plan  A  
P4 Search/Collection Process  A,B  
P5 Target Data Acquisition/Capture  A,B  
P6 Target Data Processing  A,B,C,D  
P7 Target Data Analysis  A,C,D  
P8 Format Data for Report Generation  A  
P9 QC Report  A  
P10 Transmit Report  A  
Table 6. USS READINESS CCOP Systems. 
 
As shown in Table 6, CCOP systems may be used in a single subprocess or across 
multiple subprocesses along with the existing infrastructure available in each particular 
platform.  Additionally, some systems such as CCOP A are highly complex and 







CCOP A (Example)   
Component Description/Functions 
Radio Frequency Management System • RF management 
Signal Acquisition System • Energy Search 
Audio Distribution System • Audio Routing & Recording 
Intermediate Frequency Signal Processing 
System 
• Spectrum Display Operations 
• Signal Processing Applications 
Control & Processing System • Coverage Plan Creation/Management 
Common Cryptologic Workstation (CCWS) • Database Operations 
• JMCIS Applications 
• Cryptologic Unified Build Applications 
• Microsoft Applications 
• Signal Processing Applications 
Table 7.  CCOP A Components. 
 
To accurately capture the contribution of CCOP systems across subprocesses it is 
necessary to break down each system to its individual components and functions, analyze 
the attributes of each, and insert them into the appropriate subprocess of the ICP. 
E. APPLYING KVA 
As described in the previous chapter, KVA uses a knowledge-based metaphor as a 
means to describe units of change in terms of the knowledge required to make the 
changes.  The analysis is accomplished by extracting historical data to build metrics that 
are structured in the same manner as common financial metrics.  The difference between 
KVA and other financial models though, is that KVA provides the means to analyze the 
metrics at a sub-organizational level and allows for the allocation of cost and revenue 
across subprocesses for accounting purposes. 
1. KVA Assumptions 
The underlying assumptions of KVA are that:  
• Human and technology in organizations take inputs and change them into 
outputs through core processes  
• By describing all process outputs in common units (i.e., the knowledge 
required to produce the outputs) it is possible to assign revenue, as well as 
cost, to those processes at any given point in time. 
• All outputs can be described in terms of the time required to learn how to 
produce them. 
• Learning Time is measured in common units of time and is also a 
surrogate for knowledge.  Thus, units of Learning Time can also be called 
Common Units of Output (K).   
28 
• Having a common unit of output makes it possible to compare all outputs 
in terms of cost per unit as well as price per unit, since revenue can now 
be assigned at the sub-organizational level. 
• Once cost and revenue stream have been assigned to sub-organizational 
outputs, normal accounting and financial performance and profitability 
metrics can be applied to them. 
 
2. Case Study Assumptions and Data 
The following assumptions and data apply to the USS READINESS – KVA proof 
of concept case study.  Figures and results are estimates only, and should not be viewed 
as projections of actual capabilities. 
a. Assumptions 
Length of Sample Period:  The sample period for this analysis was one 
deployment period (6 months).  For this reason, some annual cost data is adjusted to 
reflect the sample period. 
Cost Assumptions:  Cost of human capital assets was derived from annual 
U.S. Navy salary information available on the Stay Navy website for Fiscal Year 2005 
with allowances calculated for a crew home ported in San Diego, CA.  Operator rank and 
bonus level information was estimated based on a typical shipborne ISR crew.  
Equipment costs were derived from annual cost data provided by the OPNAV N20 staff.  
While equipment costs reflect installation and training costs, they do not reflect 
amortization or the total operational cost of the program. 
Proxy Revenue Assumptions:  Proxy revenues are based on the following 
assumption:  if a commercial entity or organization produces comparable outputs as a 
not-for-profit organization such as the Department of Defense, and the processes required 
to produce those outputs are comparable, certain inferences can be derived.  First, if the 
processes are comparable, the outputs of the commercial case are comparable to the 
outputs of the not-for-profit case.  Second, if market forces have placed a “value” or 
price-per-unit to the comparable commercial outputs yielding a revenue stream for the 
commercial entity, that price-per-unit can also be applied to the not-for-profit case.  
Lastly, the derived price-per-unit can be used to develop an analytical or hypothetical 
revenue stream for the not-for-profit organization.  For this research, the price-per-report 
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of nine competitive/business intelligence organizations and private military corporations 
were averaged to yield a notional market comparable price-per-unit of the outputs of the 
USS READINESS ICP.   Figure 2 illustrates two of the corporations sampled in the 
Intelligence Price-per-Unit study. 
 
Figure 2.   Intelligence Price-per-Unit Benchmarking Sample.33 
Output Assumptions:  Although the ICP onboard the ISR unit produces a 
variety of reports, only raw-intelligence reports (also known as Klieghlights or KL) were 
counted as outputs for this research.  It was also assumed that each report was of equal 
tactical value/weight and importance, in essence, all outputs were similar. 
Other Assumptions: IT Learning Time.  It was assumed that the 
knowledge embedded in information technology (IT) systems can be derived by 
averaging the time it would take an average learner to learn how to produce the outputs 
produced by the IT systems in a single subprocess output cycle.  CCOP systems are                                                  
33 Data for IHL Consulting Group was gathered from the 2005 IGL Consulting Group Research Price 
List which is available from www.ihlservices.com  
Data for J.C. Owens Global Consulting, LLC was furnished by Mr. Israel Mbachu, CFE, CII, Principal 
Partner at J.C. Owens Global Consulting, LLC. Email dated 09 September 2005. 
IHL Consulting Group 
IHL Consulting Group is a global research and advisory firm specializing in 
technologies for the retail and hospitality industries. The company, generates 
timely data reports, offers advisory services and serves as the leading retail 
technology spokesperson for industry and vendor events. IHL provides customized 
business intelligence for retailers and retail technology vendors, with particular 
expertise in supply chain and store level systems. Their customers are retailers 
and retail technology providers who want to better understand what is going on in 
the overall technology market, or wish to identify specific equipment needs for the 
retail market. 
IHL’s price per report ranges from $1,495 to $3,295 
J.C. Owens Global Consulting, LLC 
J.C. Owens Global Consulting, LLC is a subsidiary of J. C. Owens Group 
Worldwide. It has been established to provide international investigation, business 
intelligence and risk consulting services to corporate organizations and government 
agencies worldwide in 182 countries around the world. Their specific areas of capability 
include: Global Corporate Investigations; Global Business Intelligence; Intellectual 
Property/Copyright Trademark Investigations; Background/Pre-employment/Due 
Diligence/Litigation Support; Insurance Fraud & Claim Investigation. 
The firm presently covers a total of 182 countries in Africa, North/South 
America, Middle East, Central America, Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean. It maintains 
an office in Bloomfield, New Jersey, United States of America, from where it covers the 
world; and an office in Lagos, Nigeria, which handles its African operations. 
Price per Global Intelligence Report/Assignment is approximately $5,000 (US) 
30 
highly complex and at times, comprise multiple components with varying functions.  To 
estimate the time to learn of a single CCOP system, the components were analyzed 
individually.  Academic authorities on the functions performed by each were consulted to 
determine the length of time it would take an average learner (assuming at least a 
Bachelor’s of Science (B.S.) degree in Electrical Engineering or in a field related to the 
component) to learn how to produce the IT outputs.  In this case, subject matter experts in 
the functional fields of each system were consulted to estimate the IT time to learn.  
Figure 3 illustrates one such interview. 
 




                                                 
34 Department of the Navy. Vision…Presence…Power: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy – 2002 
Edition.  Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 2002. Chapter 3. 
35  Dr. Richard Adler is a Research Associate Professor in Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School.  He also holds positions in the Research Committee and is 
the Supervisor of the Signal Enhancement Lab.  Dr. Adler has 31 years of experience in undergraduate and 
graduate teaching and thesis advising, 29 years in design and analysis of VLF-UHF tactical, strategic, DF 
and broadcast antennas, 31 years in EM numerical analysis of the effects of platforms and environment on 
the performance of antennas, and 26 years Hands-On-Workshops on Numerical Antenna Modeling for wire 
antennas, reflector antennas and general scattering shapes.  He is a Registered Professional Engineer in 
California. 
CCOP C Learning Time Derivation Example 
 
To determine the learning time of CCOP C, the team first dissected the system into its basic 
functional components. CCOP C is the AN/SSQ-120(V) Transportable-Radio Direction Finder 
(T-RDF).  T-RDF provides a low-cost Medium/High/Very High/Ultra High Frequency 
(MF/HF/VHF/UHF) Direction Finding (DF) capability to selected U.S. Navy ships.  T-RDF has 
two major components, the receiving equipment and the processing unit. 
 
To analyze the system and determine its time to learn, the team consulted Dr. Richard Adler, 
an authority on signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems and antenna technologies.  It was 
assumed that, as a baseline, the “average learner” to be taught the functions of T-RDF would 
have an undergraduate degree in a related technical field such as Electrical Engineering.   
Dr. Adler suggested that the underlying disciplines that would have to be learned are: 
–Basic RF Theory (66 days) 
–EM Theory/Formal EM (198 days) 
–Basic Communications Theory (132 days) 
–Propagation Theory (66 days) 
–Antenna Theory (66 days) 
–Basic Radio Direction Finding (66 days) 
 
Aggregating the results, an estimate of 594 days of learning time would be required for the 
average learner to learn how to produce the outputs of   CCOP C. 
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b. Human Capital Data 
Individual data sheets were created for each member of the fictitious USS 
READINESS ISR crew.  The information included the typical rank and subspecialty 
designators or Navy Education Codes (NEC) of afloat-IW operators.  Military pay was 
collected along with NEC-specific bonus pay for each operator.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
amount of job specific schooling and on-the-job training received by each. 
Figure 4.   Sample Operator Data Sheets. 
The following tables contain the actual case data for the cost of human assets used in this 
research: 
Element 




Budget (Cost) per 
Sample Pd 
Div Officer  $     79,298  $             - $        39,649 
Div LPO  $     79,298  $             - $        39,649 
SigOp 1  $     61,883 $    35,475 $        48,679 
SigOp 2  $     58,190 $    14,958 $        36,574 
SigOp 3  $     44,391 $    17,177 $        30,784 
SigOp 4  $     43,397  $             - $        21,699 
SigOp 5  $     41,518  $             - $        20,759 
ComOp1  $     44,391   $        22,196 
ComOp2  $     43,397   $        21,699 
ComOp3  $     41,518   $        20,759 
   Total Human     $      302,446 
Table 8. USS READINESS Human Capital Cost Data. 
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The total amount of days of on-the-job training and job experience of the human assets 
are shown in Table 9. 
Operator 
Time in Service    
(Days) 
Pre-Deployment 
Training  (Days) 
On-Job Training  
(Days) Totals 
Div Officer      1,825          15        292      2,132 
Div LPO      4,380          15        524      4,919 
SigOp 1      3,285          30        486      3,801 
SigOp 2      2,190          30        366      2,586 
SigOp 3      1,095          30        325      1,450 
SigOp 4         730          30        219         979 
SigOp 5         730          30        184         944 
ComOp1 2190 20        325      2,535 
ComOp2 1096 20        219      1,335 
ComOp3 730 20        184         934 
Table 9. USS READINESS Operator Training Time (Days). 
 
c. Information Technology Data 
Detailed information was also gathered for the USS READINESS CCOP 
systems and fixed infrastructure analyzed in this research.  Cost data, shown below, was 
derived from annual budget estimates. 
Element 
Avg Annual Unit 
Costs 
Budget          
(Cost) per Sample 
Pd 
CCOP A $ 193,500 $     96,750 
CCOP B $   44,643 $     22,322 
CCOP C $   24,000 $     12,000 
CCOP D $ 126,923 $     63,462 
 Total CCOP   $   194,533 
Fixed IT Infrastructure    $   102,500 
  TOTAL IT   $   297,033 
Table 10. USS READINESS Systems Cost Data. 
 
To obtain the time-to-learn of CCOP systems, each was analyzed at the component or 
subsystem-level.  The learning-time for each component was then estimated by 
interviewing subject matter experts and deriving how many days it would take the 
average IW operator to learn how to perform the component operation.    The table below 





Time to Learn 
(days) 
CCOP A Aggregated Time to Learn =     4,092 
CCOP B        1,460 
CCOP C           514 
CCOP D        1,825 
Table 11. CCOP System Learning-Time. 
 
3. KVA Steps 
The following is a summarized synopsis of the steps in using the KVA method 
once the required data has been gathered.  Two of the USS READINESS ICP 
subprocesses are used to illustrate the computations, subprocesses P4 and P8.  Appendix 
A contains the actual analysis.  Each step also contains the definitions of variables and 
relevant formulas used. 
a. Step One:  Estimate Process Time- to-Learn 
(1)  Definitions: 
Time to Learn (tL) is the time it would take the average learner to learn how to produce 
a single subprocess output.   
 
Human Time to Learn (tLH) is the time it would take the average learner to learn the 
human-specific portions of the subprocess required to produce a single subprocess output.  
In this case factors such as time-in-service, schooling, on the job training, and pre-
deployment training of each operator were used to estimate the human time to learn. 
 
IT Time to Learn (tLIT) is the time it would take the same average learner to learn how 
to produce the outputs produced by the IT systems in a single subprocess output cycle.  In 
this case, subject matter experts in the functional fields of each system were consulted to 
estimate the IT time to learn as exampled in Figure 3. 
 
% Automation is the percent of a process that is automated by information technology 
(IT) over and above human contribution. 
 
 (2)  Description:  First, the time it takes an average Information 
Warfare operator to learn one whole subprocess is estimated.  This represents the amount 
of knowledge required to produce a single aggregate subprocess output.  Time to Learn 
(tL) is estimated by summing the average time spent in training the process (pre-
deployment training), the combined training experience of each operator performing the 
process (Table 9.), and the learning time embedded in each IT system multiplied by the  
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percent automation of the particular subprocess.  The time to learn of CCOP systems 















tLH               
(days) 
Tot tLH     
(days) 
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Automat'n    
(days) 
Tot tL for 1 
Process 











n  A  10 4804 4814 409 71.67%      293.27     5,107.27  
Table 12. P4 and P8 Time to Learn. 
 
b. Steps Two and Three:  Calculate the K Produced by IT and 
Human Assets.  Find the Total K for Each Subprocess 
(1)  Definitions: 
K is the descriptive term chosen for the common units of output estimated by KVA. 
 
Executions (Ex) are the average number of times a process asset, human or IT, produced 
an individual subprocess output. 
 
KH is the common units of output attributed to human-asset contribution. 
 
KIT is the common units of output attributed to IT-asset contribution. 
 
KP is the total common units of output for each subprocess. 
 
   (2)  Formulas: 
Total subprocess-asset output: KAsset = (ExAsset) (tL)   
Total subprocess output:  KP = KH + KIT     
Total process output:   KTOT = Σ(KP )    
 
(3)  Description:  The number of times an element, human or IT, 
executes a subprocess is tallied and then multiplied by the time to learn of the particular 
subprocess.  The resulting number is the amount of output, by asset, used in the execution 
of the subprocess.  Once the K for each asset has been calculated, it is summed to reveal 
the total K for each subprocess. 
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by Asset   
P4 




by Asset   
P8 
Total K    
P8 
1 Div Officer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 Div LPO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 SigOp 1 135.00 1378260.68 0.00 0.00 
1 SigOp 2 144.00 1470144.72 0.00 0.00 
1 SigOp 3 162.00 1653912.81 0.00 0.00 
1 SigOp 4 152.00 1551819.43 0.00 0.00 
1 SigOp 5 158.00 1613075.46 0.00 0.00 
1 ComOp1 0.00 0.00 78.00 398367.34 
1 ComOp2 0.00 0.00 78.00 398367.34 
1 ComOp3 0.00 0.00 79.00 403474.62 
        
        
1 CCOP A 751.00 7667213.09 235.00 1200209.31 
1 CCOP B 92.00 939259.13 0.00 0.00 
1 CCOP C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 CCOP D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 
IT Fixed 
Infrastructure 235.00 2399194.51 235.00 1200209.31 
  KP 18672879.81  3600627.92 
Table 13. P4 and P8 Total K by Asset. 
 
Subprocess Name 
KIT            
(automation 
& infras)     KH KTOT 
P4 Search/Collection  
  
10,909,092.30  
     
7,599,933.50  
    
18,509,025.80  
P8 
Format Data for 
Report Generation 
    
2,342,721.41  
     
1,171,360.71  
      
3,514,082.12  




c. Steps Four and Five:  Derive Proxy Revenue Stream and 
Develop the Value Equation Numerator by Assigning Revenue 
Streams to Subprocesses. 
(1)  Definitions: 
Market Comparable Price per Unit is the notional price per unit allocated to the outputs of 
non-profit organizations based on the market price per unit of the comparable outputs of a 
similar commercial organization. 
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% K is percent of the total K produced by an individual subprocess or asset. 
 
(2) Formulas: 
Proxy Revenue: RTOT = (Total # of Process Outputs) (Market Comp. Price per Unit)   
 
% of Total K per Subprocess:   % KP = (KP / KTOT) x 100% 
 
Subprocess Revenue Allocation:   RP = %KP  x  RTOT     
 
(3) Description:  First, utilizing the Market Comparables approach, 
the total number of ICP outputs is multiplied by the average market price-per-unit to 
yield a Proxy Revenue for the USS READINESS ICP. 
Proxy Revenue Assumptions  
Market Comparable Price Per Unit (avg)  $ 3,800  
Avg# Reports executed/sample pd 235  
Avg Proxy for Revs - Sample Pd (RTOT)  $ 893,000  
 
Table 15. USS READINESS ICP Proxy Revenue Assumption. 
 
Next, the percent of the total process K produced by each 
subprocess is calculated. 
Subprocess Name 
K for IT       
(automation 
& infras)     
K for 
Humans Total K 
% of Total 
K per sub-
process 
P4 Search/Collection  
  
10,909,092.30  
     
7,599,933.50  
    
18,509,025.80  24.5398% 
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation 
    
2,342,721.41  
     
1,171,360.71  
      




   
22,765,206.13  
    
75,424,588.68  100.0000% 
Table 16. P4 and P8 Percent K. 
 
Revenues can now be assigned to subprocesses, people and IT 






Humans Total K 























     
7,599,933.50  
    
18,509,025.80  24.5398%  $ 219,140  10.0762%  $ 89,980  
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation 
     
1,171,360.71  
      
3,514,082.12  4.6591%  $ 41,605  1.5530%  $ 13,868  
  
   
22,765,206.13  
    
75,424,588.68  100.0000%  $ 893,000  30.1827%  $ 269,532  
Table 17. P4 and P8 Proxy Revenue Allocation for Human Contribution. 
 
Subprocess Name 
K for IT          
(automation & 


























     
10,909,092.30     18,509,025.80 10.08%  $ 89,980  1.23%  $ 11,023  
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation 
       
2,342,721.41       3,514,082.12 1.55%  $ 13,868  0.00%  $  -  
  
     
52,659,382.55     75,424,588.68 30.18%  $ 269,532  3.82%  $ 34,110  






















Process K       
($US) 
% of Total K 











Collection  0.00%  $                   -  0.00%  $                       -  3.15%  $       28,156  
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation 0.00%  $                   -  0.00%  $                       -  1.55%  $       13,868  
  6.52%  $          58,253  2.23%  $             19,906  27.06%  $     241,667  
 






d. Step Six:  Develop the Value Equation Denominator by 
Assigning Costs to Subprocesses 
(1)  Description:  Costs are assigned directly to each subprocess 
based on the assets producing outputs in each.  The cost of human and IT assets that are 
assigned to multiple processes are divided evenly throughout those subprocesses.  The 























K       
($US) 
P4 Search/Collection   $  219,140   $ 64,642   $ 89,980  $37,276.47 
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation  $  41,605   $ 52,252   $ 13,868  $32,326.50 
   $  893,000   $ 622,607   $ 269,532   $  292,533  








to CCOP A 












to CCOP B 




to CCOP B 




Collection   $ 89,980   $ 9,675   $  11,023   $ 7,441  
P8 
Format Data for 
Report 
Generation  $ 13,868   $  9,675   $  -    
   $ 269,532   $  96,750   $  34,110   $ 22,322  




















to CCOP D 






















K        
($US) 
 $ -     $ -     $ 28,156   $ 10,250  
 $ -     $ -     $ 13,868   $ 10,250  
 $ 58,253   $ 12,000   $ 19,906   $ 63,462   $ 241,667   $ 102,500  
Table 22. P4 and P8 Cost Allocation for CCOP C, D, and Fixed IT Infrastructure. 
 
e. Steps Seven, Eight and Nine: Calculate the Value Equation 
(ROI) 
(1)  Definitions: 
ROK is the Return on Knowledge, a productivity ratio 
ROKA is the Return on Knowledge Assets, a profitability ratio 
ROKI is the Return on Knowledge Investment, the value equation 
 
(2)  Formulas: 
Total Return on Knowledge:  ROK = Revenue / Cost   
 
Subprocess ROK (as percentage):   ROKP = (RP / CP) x 100% 
 
Subprocess ROKA:     ROKAP = ( RP – CP ) / ( %KP  x  RTOT ) 
 
Subprocess ROKI:     ROKIP = ( RP – CP ) / ( CP  )   
 
(2)  Description:  The revenues and costs assigned to subprocesses, 
people and IT are used to calculate the value equations. 
KVA Metrics for Total K 
  Subprocess Name ROK as Ratio ROK as % ROKA ROKI 
P4 Search/Collection              3.39  339.01% 70.50% 239.01%
P8 
Format Data for 
Report Generation             0.80  79.63% -25.59% -20.37%
Metrics for Aggregated            14.10  1410.20% 157.31% 410.20%
Table 23. P4 and P8 KVA Metrics. 
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Note:  For Human and IT ROK, ROKA, and ROKI, the Cost and Revenue of each asset 
is substituted for subprocess cost and revenues in the value equations. 
 






Table 24. KVA Results for USS READINESS 
 
E. ANALYZING THE KVA RESULTS 
KVA provides a unique and insightful means of measuring the contributions of 
Information Technology and human assets to the production of process outputs.  By 
analyzing an organization, process or function at the subprocess-level, this methodology 
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allows military leaders and program managers to structure a problem and solution set in 
an empirical manner.  The results can then be used to conduct comparative analyses of 
multiple human and IT configurations of similar processes with the final goal of ensuring 
the best possible posturing of people, equipment and the increasingly limited funding-
dollars within the organization and the Department of Defense. 
While profitability is not the goal of the DoD, and other non-profit organizations, 
it is their goal and responsibility to the individual taxpayer, to ensure that the limited 
resources are managed in a reasonable, accountable and transparent manner.  In this case, 
KVA was used to quantify the value added by Cryptologic Carry-On Program systems, 
Information Warfare/Cryptologic operators, and the enabling shipborne infrastructure 
with which they interact.  The result is an assessment of the efficiency (productivity) and 
effectiveness (profitability) of human-system performance within the Intelligence 
Collection Process.  To obtain a more comprehensive picture of CCOP system 
contribution, multiple iterations of this analysis would have to be run across the Navy-
wide enterprise of intelligence collection platforms.  That is not to say though, that 
analyzing a single process yields no value.  Looking at the USS READINESS case study 
on its own, it is possible to interpret the KVA analysis results and identify targets of 
transformation within the subprocesses of the Intelligence Collection Process.  It is 
possible to look at the individual assets and ask “why?” an asset contributes more or less 
than others, and “how?” the performance of assets impacts the overall output of the 
process. 
1. Case Example Results 
Looking back at the two subprocesses detailed in the case study, P4 and P8, a few 
questions can be asked: 
• What makes P4 such a high performer, with an overall return of 239% 
versus a return of -20.37% for P8? 
• P8, Format Data for Report Generation, only executes once per KL report 
(process output), yet almost a third of all the operators (ComOp 1, 
ComOp2, ComOp3) in this particular case are assigned to this subprocess 
for almost a fifth of the total human cost. 
• P8 is more automated than P4.  Could P8 be further automated or could it 
be performed by the other operators in lieu of the three communications 
operators to yield higher efficiency and effectiveness?   
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• P4, Search and Collect, is a knowledge-intensive function requiring a high 
system and human capital asset investment.  Each process output requires 
many executions of P4.  Could an even higher return be achieved with 
automated search and collection systems or more operators? 
Other observations of this case example could include: 
• Should the amount of knowledge in humans and IT be adjusted? 
• Is a broader range of training required to allow all operators to perform 
more functions? 
• CCOP D is a cost-heavy system but executes very few times, 
comparatively, throughout the sample period.  Is CCOP D appropriate for 
this platform and mission?  Is there a cheaper alternative to CCOP D?  Are 
all the operators appropriately trained in the use of CCOP D? 
These are the kinds of questions CCOP program mangers and other stake-holders 
can begin to ask.  The answers to these questions can help CCOP program managers 
allocate funds to new systems or to existing systems for product improvement, or if 
further study deems it so, to cut a system all together from the portfolio.  The results can 
also be used to tailor the manning and training requirements of ISR crews deploying with 
CCOP systems. 
Finally, KVA also provides the structured data required to perform various 
methods of risk analysis and performance projections such as Real Options Analysis.  
The combination of KVA historical performance metrics and real options analytic tools 
will enable the CCOP Program Office and the U.S. Navy to estimate and compare the 
future value added of different mixes of humans and systems as well as a range of new 
initiatives for the deployment and employment options of both.   
 
2. Current Limitations of Knowledge Value Added  
This case study revealed a few limitations to the implementation of KVA to the 
Intelligence Collection Process as modeled in for the USS READINESS, which are 
currently being addressed.  They are: 
• With the raw data required for the analysis residing in multiple databases 
of varying classification levels, data-gathering mechanisms that are less 
human-intensive and more automated need to be created to extract the 
required information. 
• Although the ICP in this case study was developed through the use of 
subject matter experts, a standard description and definition of each 
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subprocess should be reached through a Intelligence Community-wide 
consensus of process stake-holders. 
• A more detailed research should be conducted to analyze the knowledge 
embedded in each IT system to accurately capture the benefits resulting 
from the execution of particular system processes. 
• The Market Comparables approach to valuing the outputs of non-profit 
organizations, although used as a rough baseline to monetize outputs in 
this case study, requires a more in-depth look at comparable organizations 
utilizing similar processes to produce similar outputs.  The creation of a 
broad database of such organizations is currently being conducted to 
benchmark industries by functional groupings and products. 
• Lastly, to provide a more powerful analysis of the ICP, a database of 
comparable historical KVA information should be created to benchmark 





Maritime ISR will remain at the core of the Naval Operational Doctrine and will 
continue to be an essential element in improving the speed and effectiveness of naval and 
joint operations.  Innovations resulting from the transformation of the DoD’s business 
practices must be refined to meet the unique challenges posed by Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance programs.  It is the responsibility of program managers 
and DoD officials to do their very best to create realistic objectives, clear guidance and an 
effective organization when executing the resources of the United States in defense of the 
nation.    Dwight D. Eisenhower once said: 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, 
signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, 
those who are cold and are not clothed. 
      -Dwight D. Eisenhower 
The citizens of the country are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge 
whether the national objectives are being met in a responsible manner. 
Congress recently criticized the DoD’s acquisition and testing and evaluation of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems, stating that there has been 
“inadequate data to compare systems’ capabilities and costs across the spectrum of 
intelligence programs, an imbalance between collection and analysis programs, and an 
intelligence effort that does not reflect an optimal allocation of resources.”36  Section 355 
of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177) required a report from the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense assessing progress in 
the development of “a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the 
utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities for 
the collection of intelligence ... [and] the improvement of coordination between the 
Department [of Defense] and the intelligence community on strategic and budgetary 
planning.”37 
                                                 
36 Best, Richard.  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Issues for Congress.  CRS Report 
for Congress (RL 32508). Washington: Congressional Research Service, 22 Feb 2005. p. 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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Assessing the impact and overall value of information technology investments, 
such as ISR systems, has been a continuing challenge, both in business and in the DoD.  
The solution to the valuation of IT systems has been referred to as one of the “holy grails 
of the Information Systems (IS) field,” most notably, at a May 2005 presentation of this 
case study at the DoD’s 2nd Annual Acquisitions Symposium in Monterey, California.  But 
even skeptics of the various methodologies proposed for measuring the value of IT 
acquisitions agree that a common framework must be created for understanding, 
evaluating, and in the end, justifying the impact of government investments in 
information technology on the overall successful completion of the national security 
mission of the United States.   
The challenges in determining the value and risk associated with ISR systems 
acquisitions are plenty.  In this particular case, the use of Commercial of the Shelf and 
Government off the Shelf (COTS/GOTS) systems and open systems architectures in ISR 
systems provide a level of risk, which must be managed.  Technological complexities, the 
reliance on evolving software and systems, shortened acquisitions timelines and funding 
instability all contribute to this risk in Navy ISR systems such as the Cryptologic Carry-
On Program (CCOP).  Although the DoD has instituted rigorous types of testing and 
evaluation (T&E) for all of its programs and projects to mitigate risk, metrics for IT 
systems have lacked the requisite depth for meaningful valuation.  Crucial to successful 
T&E is the development of measurable Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) to provide accurate projections of system 
performance in a variety of operational environments.   
It was the goal of this research to provide the means to extract measures of value 
and effectiveness to the CCOP Program office through the use of the Housel-Kenevsky 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) Methodology.  Applying KVA to the USS 
READINESS Case Study showed that the program managers could build metrics that are 
meaningful and useful in performing sound financial analysis of each system’s 
performance at the process and subprocess level.  KVA analysis also identified a new 
category and source of raw data which can provide insights into the relationship of cost 
and value of organizations, processes, and asset investments.  This new data allows 
managers and senior decision makers to discuss the “value” of seemingly intangible 
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assets in a defensible, empirical and replicable manner.  Lastly, KVA facilitates the 
transformation and continuous process improvement of the DoD’s global intelligence 
mission.  Through KVA analysis, the operational value of CCOP systems can be 
measured and managed to ensure a responsible stewardship of the nation’s resources and 
ensure that the soldiers and sailors who use these systems are receiving the right tools 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The quest for the holy grail of information technology is far from over.  An 
accurate valuation of Cryptologic Cary-On Program systems will come through an 
organizational transformation and operational transformation as well.   
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) Methodology, as any other methodology, is 
only as effective and meaningful as the data used to apply it.  As indicated in the case 
study, data collection challenges remain.  It is recommended that processes, both human 
and automated, be created to gather the required performance data in near-real-time.  
Automated logging of system utilization and performance are readily available in many 
business applications.  Adapting such mechanisms directly into CCOP systems would 
facilitate the analysis of their performance.  Human activity and performance 
mechanisms have also been used in the past, both in business and in the DoD. 
KVA is a robust methodology, when applied throughout an enterprise with the 
appropriate inputs, it is capable of analyzing the data and returning defensible, 
quantifiable results in near-real-time.  Although several accounting software packages 
have included KVA analytical capabilities, the research team at the Naval Postgraduate 
School identified the GaussSoft Valuation Software as the most capable software 
platform for conducting the level of analysis required by DoD program managers for 
valuing IT systems and processes.  A brief overview of GaussSoft and screen shots of the 
multi-faceted reports produced by the software package are provided in Appendix B.  It is 
recommended that this software package be deployed to receive real-time system and 
process inputs from deployed units operating CCOP systems as a proof-of-concept and 
operational test of the software capabilities. 
A true measure of the impact of CCOP systems will require that the methodology 
and data gathering be analyzed and refined over a larger sampling of time.  KVA, in its 
current form is ready for deployment; it is recommended that a study be conducted on 
CCOP systems at the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
level over the course of one deployment to begin establishing performance baselines for 
systems and processes.  It is also recommended that a community-wide effort be enacted 
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along with the system developers to determine a universally accepted description of the 
embedded knowledge and required learning time of each system and process.  A more in 
depth and extensive research should be conducted on the Market Comparables Approach 
to include a valuation study of the intelligence products produced by private military 
corporations (PMCs) as well as competitive and business intelligence organizations to 
achieve a common baseline which can be applied directly to DoD intelligence products.  
A KVA baseline should also  
Lastly, it is recommended that an organization be identified to maintain KVA 
databases for CCOP systems.  Such organization could be a central repository for system 
performance data as well as a ready source of performance and valuation reports which 
can be tapped quarterly or yearly by program managers wishing to make informed 
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APPENDIX B. GAUSSSOFT OVERVIEW 
[GAUSS Overview provided courtesy of GaussSoft, Inc. <http:www.gaussoft.com>] 
GAUSS is a line of software created by GaussSoft, Inc., a privately held US 
corporation founded in 1993, with headquarters in San Jose, California and an extended 
presence with offices and partners in NorthAmerica, Europe and Latin America. 
GaussSoft delivers scalable Enterprise Performance Intelligence solutions. 
GaussSoft products enable large and medium-sized companies to control and reduce the 
cost of enterprise operations, increase profitability and improve organizational 
productivity by providing flexibility, scalability and ease of use. 
GaussSoft’s solutions are built on an integrated suite of high performance 
products for Profit and Cost Analysis, Multidimensional Query, and Activity Reporting 
that are scalable, function-rich, and easy to use. 
GaussSoft has installed performance intelligence solutions in over 200 enterprise 
and consulting companies all around the world, including telecommunication, banking, 
manufacturing and agribusiness firms and government organizations. They have been 
implemented in customer premises by leading consulting firms including Deloitte, 
KPMG and Price. 
GaussSoft suite includes: 
Gauss - Profit and Cost Allocation Engine: This strategic decision-making and 
analysis solution enables companies to know which products, services, and customers are 
making profits and which aren't. Using different value and costing methodologies this 
solution helps reduce and control the cost of enterprise operations, increase profitability 
and improve organizational productivity. 
Gauss - KVA: Knowledge Value Added (KVA) is a methodology that allows any 
organization to calculate the economic performance of core processes by providing an 
objective way to allocate revenue to the processes at any level within the organization. 
Knowing how much revenue corporate knowledge is producing, allows organizations to 
dramatically improve their effectiveness and efficiency.  
60 
Gauss - Planning: This enterprise collaborative solution allows thousands of 
users to perform corporate enterprise planning, including financial planning, budgeting 
and forecasting up to 10 times faster. When used with Gauss Profit and Gauss KVA, an 
organization can create plans optimized for profitability and value. 
Gauss - Radial Viewer: This is a Business Intelligence (BI) front-end with 
graphical interaction. This tool enables all End Users to create their own queries and 
professional looking reports from scratch -in seconds-.  
Figures 5-7 are graphical outputs of GaussSoft products. 
 





Figure 6.   GaussSoft Radial Viewer Report Design Screen. 
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